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1 Introduction
The Marshallian approach to perfect competition focusses on a world where rms have
U-shaped average cost curves and where the long-run competitive equilibrium was one
in which all rms were producing at e¢ cient scale. As pointed out by Novshek and
Sonnenschein (1987), this contrasts with the Arrow-Debreu setting where rms pro-
duction sets are convex, so that both average and marginal costs are non-decreasing1.
Furthermore, the number of rms is taken as given in general equilibrium analysis
(Smith (1974)). Turning to explicitly dynamic macroeconomic models, the rm
is often ignored unless there is imperfect competition. Where the number of rms
is endogenous, although entry and exit are essentially dynamic phenomena, macro-
economists have made them into non-intertemporal phenomena. One approach is to
have instantaneous free entry, so that the number of rms is that which ensures zero
actual prots (see for example Devereux et al. (1996), Heijdra (1988), Coto-Martinez
and Dixon (2003))2 or zero expected prots (Hopenhayn (1992)). An alternative is
to treat the number of rms as xed over time determined by a non-dynamic long-run
zero prot condition (Hornstein (1993)).
What this paper does is to introduce a rigorous treatment of the entry process
and number of rms in a perfectly competitive dynamic general equilibrium economy
and traces through the production process from the rm level to the aggregate This
model is a generalization of the classic Ramsey model in which the rm level is not
modelled and the representative household chooses consumption as a control variable
and capital is the state variable. Here, there is an additional state-variable (the
number of rms) and control (entry). This results in a four dimensional dynamic
system, with a two-dimensional stable manifold. As we shall see, the related Ramsey
model implicitly adopts two approaches: either there is a xed number of rms, or
else the number of rms adjusts instantaneously to the level of capital. However,
these are too extreme: we allow for the case where the ow of entry is determined
endogenously by an equilibrium entry model developed by Datta and Dixon (2002).
The process of entry and the accumulation of capital interact in an explicitly dynamic
setting. The entry model assumes that entry has a price at each instant in time,
and this is increasing in the ow of entry and is zero when there is no entry (this is
a special case of endogenous entry costs introduced by Das and Das (1996)). The
dynamic equilibrium which results is one in which the cost of entry at each instant
equals the net present value of an incumbent rm: as a consequence rms have no
1McKenzie (1959) took a quasi-Marshallian approach by assuming that an aggregate production
function existed so that production sets are convex cones, this imposing the long-run constant returns
of the Marshallian view point by the argument that the possibility of division and replication implies
that the aggregate production function will have constant returns.
2This assumption is also made in the theory of Contestable markets, (see Baumol et al. (1982)).
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incentive to delay or bring forward the time of entry/exit. In steady-state, there is
zero entry and rms earn zero prots and we have the Marshallian long-run where
average and marginal cost are equated. On trajectories towards steady-state, the
ow of prots may be positive or negative and output per rm will di¤er from the
e¢ cient scale of production.
From the perspective of the representative household and the social planner, there
are two ways of accumulating wealth: one is to set up new rms, the other is to
accumulate capital. At all times, there is an arbitrage condition which ensures
that the two assets have the same return. In steady-state the rms are at one level
worthless, since they earn zero prots and have a zero marginal product. However, on
another they are highly valuable: they enable the e¢ cient organization of production
in steady-state, where labour and capital are combined so that production occurs at
the e¢ cient scale and marginal cost equals average cost. Even though rms earn no
prots in steady-state, rms will be set up (or closed down) on the way to steady-state
equilibrium.
One of the most interesting ndings of the paper is that for a wide range of initial
conditions we can have a non-monotonic trajectory in one of the state-variables (but
not both, because the roots are all real) 3 . This happens because of the interactions
between the two state-variables: the number of rms inuences the marginal product
of capital, and the stock of capital inuences the protability of rms. For example,
even if the number of rms is above its steady-state value, if there is a large capital
stock this will boost rm protability and lead to entry on the initial part of the
trajectory. Likewise, a large number of rms boosts the marginal product of capital
which may lead to initial capital being accumulated even though in the long-run
capital is decumulated.
We study two types of technology shocks: one is a productivity variable that
alters the marginal product of labour and capital; the other is the ow xed costs per
rm. We prove that productivity shocks will expand the economy by generating an
increase in the number of rms while the rm-size will be asymptotically invariant.
An increase in the xed cost will imply an increase in rm size and a reduction in
the number of rms asymptotically. An increase in both size and the number of
rms occurs if the two shocks are positively correlated. We derive critical values for
the correlation of shocks that result in non-monotonic trajectories in capital or the
number of rms.
Existing papers that adopt a genuine dynamic entry model have assumed that
there is only one state variable by removing capital. Thus Aloi and Dixon (2002)
adopt the same entry model as this paper, but assume imperfect competition and
3This complements ndings in a non-general equilibrium context with non-monotonic entry dy-
namics Gort and Klepper (1982) and Das and Das (1996).
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labour as the only input. Bilbiie et al (2005) assume that there is an exogenous xed
entry cost and that the entrant evaluates the expected net present value of an incum-
bent. Free entry means that in equilibrium the net present value of an incumbent is
equal to the entry cost. Again, this model assumes imperfect competition and no
capital. Smith (1974) develops a genuine dynamic model of entry in a perfectly
competitive economy. What determines the ow of entry in Smiths model is the
opportunity cost of current consumption, since setting up a rm requires a one-o¤
xed labour input. Hence, if more rms are set up (or dismantled), then there is less
labour available to provide for current consumption.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 the model is presented, section 3
studies the dynamics and section 4 reports the comparative dynamics for productivity
and xed costs shocks (uncorrelated and correlated).
2 The model
There is an innitely lived household and at any time t a continuum of rms i 2
[0; n(t)]. Households o¤er a xed labour supply to rms and invest in their equity.
Firms produce a single nal product which is used for consumption and investment.
Firms and households are price-takers in all markets. We now turn to the optimization
programmes of rms and households in more detail.
2.1 Household
Households consume and collect income from investments in nancial assets (equity)
and labour income. They choose the trajectory of consumption fC(t); t  0g to
maximize lifetime utility U :
U =
Z 1
0
u(C(t))e tdt
where u0 > 0 > u00, u0(0) = +1; lim
C!+1
u0(c) = 0. The accumulation equation for
nancial assets is the instantaneous budget constraint
_V = r(t)V (t) + w(t)  C(t): (1)
where r and w are the real rate of return on equity and the real wage rate, respectively,
and the labour supply is normalized to unity. The initial level of wealth V (0) is given
and the no-Ponzi-game condition limt!1 e 
R t
0 r(s)dsV (t) = 0 holds.
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In the set of the admissible consumption and wealth accumulation strategies, the
optimal path of (C(t); V (t)) satises the Euler equation
_C =
C
(C)
(r(t)  ) (2)
where    u00(C)C=u0(C), and the transversality condition which is
lim
t!1
e tu
0
(C(t))V (t) = 0: (3)
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of rms, i 2 [0; n(t)], where n(t) is the measure of rms operating
at instant t. Firms are price takers in all the markets in which they participate: they
hire labour and capital to produce output which they sell to households.
At every moment in time there is entry. That is, at instant t consider that the
number of rms will pass in the interval between t to t +  from n(t) to n(t + ). If
n(t) < n(t + ) there is entry and if n(t) > n(t + ) there is exit. The rate of entry
is n(t+) n(t)

. If the interval shrinks to zero, then the instantaneous rate of entry is
_n(t) = lim!0
n(t+) n(t)

. We dene:
e(t) = _n: (4)
Conceptually, we can divide the decisions made by rms into two parts. First,
there is the intra-temporal decision about how much output to produce and corre-
spondingly how much labour and capital to employ. This decision is made by all the
n(t) incumbent rms at time t. This will depend only on the output and input prices
prevailing at instant t. Second, there is the inherently dynamic entry decision. At
any instant t, non-incumbent rms have to decide whether to enter now or later (or
never); incumbent rms have to decide whether to exit now or later (or never). We
will look at these two decisions in turn.
2.2.1 Production.
We start with the problem for incumbent rms i 2 [0; n(t)] in instant t. Each rm
employs capital and labour according to the following technology:
y(i; t) = AF (k(i; t); l(i; t))  ; (5)
where A > 0 is a productivity parameter and  > 0 represents a xed overhead in
terms of nal output. F is strictly concave, homogeneous of degree  < 1 in capital
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and labour4. The Inada conditions hold for the marginal products of capital and
labour. Since the function F is homogenous, the dual cost-function corresponding to
(5) can be written as
B(w; r; y) = b(w; r):

y + 
A
1=
; (6)
where w and r are the rental cost of labour and capital respectively and b(w; r) is
an increasing convex function of (w; r). The average cost function corresponding
to (5) is of the standard U shaped variety: marginal cost is increasing since  < 1,
average cost is initially decreasing and then increasing because of the overhead element
( > 0). This implies that there is an optimal scale to the rm, where average cost
is minimized. From (6), for any (w; r) >> 0 average cost AC is minimized at the
e¢ cient rm size ye
ye =

1   : (7)
Figure 1
The optimal capital and labour corresponding this can then be obtained using Shep-
herds Lemma (ke = Br(w; r; ye); le = Bw(w; r; ye)). It is useful to note that A does
not a¤ect the e¢ cient scale, although it does reduce optimal factor inputs. A de-
crease in  reduces both e¢ cient scale and factor inputs. As rms have the same
technology, from now on we set k(i; t) = k(t), l(i; t) = l(t) and y(i; t) = y(t) for any
i 2 [0; n(t)]. We dene rm size by output y(t).
We can dene the supernormal prot of the rm  as the surplus when each factor
is priced at its marginal product:
(t) = y(t)  A (Fkk(t) + Fll(t)) = (1  )AF   : (8)
The zero-prot condition is thus:
AF (k(t); l(t)) =

1   : (9)
Note that this condition is equivalent to (7): hence the zero prot condition implies
technical e¢ ciency when factors are priced at their marginal products (hence P =
MC = AC). If output is above ye prots are strictly positive (since P =MC > AC)
and negative if below ye.
4Recall that homogeneity of degree  for F implies the following relationships between F (x; y)
and its derivatives: Fxx+ Fyy = F , (x; y)  @
2F (x;y)
@(x;y)2  (x; y) = (   1)F , xFxx + yFxy = (   1)Fx
and xFxy + yFyy = (   1)Fy.
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2.2.2 Entry and exit
The model of entry is based on Datta and Dixon (2002). Potential entrants (and
quitters) evaluate the net present value NPV of incumbency,
NPV (t) =
Z 1
t
(s)e 
R s
t r()dds: (10)
We assume that there is a congestion e¤ect which makes the cost of entry (exit) q rise
with the ow of entry (and exit): in particular we assume that they are proportional:
q(t) =

2
e(t); (11)
which implies a total cost of entry in terms of output used to set up (dismantle) rms
is
Z(t) = q(t):e(t) = 
e(t)2
2
(12)
where  is a parameter measuring the dynamic barriers to entry (DBE). The con-
gestion e¤ect might arise from the setting up of rms at the same instant of time
stretching some nite resource: the technology for the setting up of new rms has
diminishing returns.
The free entry condition means that the ow of entry equates the cost of entry q
to the net present value of incumbency:
q(t) =
Z 1
t
(s)e 
R s
t r()dds (13)
If we time-di¤erentiate equation (13) we obtain
_q =  (t) + r(t)q(t) (14)
Re-arranging (14), we can see that this is an arbitrage equation, equating the rate of
returns on investment and setting up a new rms:
r(t) =
(t)
q(t)
+
_q(t)
q(t)
: (15)
There are two elements to the RHS of (15): the prot earned by entering now and
the change in the cost of entry. If entry costs are rising (falling) it means that there
is an incentive to bring forward (delay) the moment of entry. Substituting (11) into
(14) we obtain the dynamic equation for entry:
_e = r(t)e(t)  (t)=: (16)
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The entry decision is inherently intertemporal. The entrant looks over the future
and decides whether or not to pay the entry cost now. An important implication
of equation (10) is that entry can be non-zero when current prots are zero. Since
it is the NPV of prots that matters, the entrant evaluates the ow of prots along
the entire trajectory: thus for example, rms may enter even when current prots
are negative if prots eventually become positive. As we shall see, this is exactly
what happens along some equilibrium trajectories in this economy. This contrasts
with the dynamic entry model of Howrey and Quandt (1968) where the ow of entry
is related solely to the instantaneous prots5. Bilbiie et al (2005) present a genuine
dynamic model of entry in which the entrant evaluates the expected net present value
of being an incumbent: however, the model is not solved analytically and there is an
exogenous xed entry cost which means that there is not a unique steady state which
makes it inconsistent with the long-run competitive equilibrium (in our paper, the
entry cost is zero in steady-state).
In equilibrium the entrant is indi¤erent between entering and not entering. Since
this holds at each point in time, the potential entrant is also indi¤erent as to the
timing of entry. For example, if the rm delays entering when the cost of entry is
falling, it will nd that the lower entry cost is exactly o¤set by the lower NPV of
prots when it nally enters. This dynamic model of entry yields a dynamic zero-
prot condition. The presence of entry costs means that the incumbents can earn
strictly non-zero prots (losses) on the path to steady-state: the ow of entry adjusts
so that the entry (exit) cost just balances the NPV of prots (losses) to be made. In
the long-run steady-state, the cost of entry is zero and both the NPV of incumbents
and the ow of prots  are zero.
2.3 Aggregation
Let us denote the aggregate capital and labour available at time t as K(t) and L(t).
For a given number of rms, the optimal allocation across rms is to have equal
capital and labour in each rm. This follows from the fact that marginal cost is
everywhere increasing at the rm level. This is the outcome of decentralized factor
markets where all rms face the same factor prices. Hence
K(t) =
Z n(t)
0
k(i; t)di =
Z n(t)
0
k(t)di = n(t)k(t);
L(t) =
Z n(t)
0
l(i; t)di =
Z n(t)
0
l(t)di = n(t)l(t):
5See also Meyers and Weintraub (1971) and Okuguchi (1972).
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For simplicity, we assume that L(t) = 1, so that l(t) = 1=n(t) and the rm size and
prots are:
y(t) = AF

K(t)
n(t)
;
1
n(t)

  ; (17)
(t) = (1  )AF

K(t)
n(t)
;
1
n(t)

  :
Hence aggregate output in the economy is:
Y (t) =
Z n(t)
0
y(t)di = n(t)y(t);
to yield the aggregate output as a function of (K;n)
Y (K;n;A; ) = n

AF

K
n
;
1
n

  

:
For analyzing the dynamics of the system, it is best to represent the aggregate pro-
duction technology Y (K;n) in terms of the marginal product of K and n; the two
state variables. Hence, the aggregate and the rm level marginal productivity of
capital are equal, and there are decreasing returns at the aggregate level:
YK = AFk > 0; YKK =
A
n
Fkk < 0:
The derivative of aggregate output with respect to the number of rms is equal
to the prot per rm,
Yn =  A

Fk
K
n
+ Fl
1
n

+ AF    = (1  )AF    = : (18)
Hence, a zero prot equilibrium maximizes output Yn = 0 if  = 0. Also, entry
boosts the marginal product of labour and capital:
YKn =  A
n

Fkk
K
n
+ Fkl
1
n

=
A
n
(1  )Fk > 0;
more rms means less inputs per rm so that the marginal products increase. Al-
though there are diminishing returns at the rm level, the aggregate production
function Y (K;L; n) is homogeneous of degree 1 in (K;L; n) : Hence, if you double
capital and labour and also double the number of rms, productivity and output at
the rm level are una¤ected, so that aggregate output also doubles.
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The real interest rate is the real rate of return on capital:
r(K;n;A; ) = YK(K;n;A; );
which is decreasing in the stock of capital and is increasing in the number of rms and
the productivity parameter: rK = YKK < 0 and rn = YKn > 0, rA = YKA > 0; r = 0:
From (18) we can write prots per rm as a function of aggregate variables:
 (K;n;A; ) = Yn(K;n;A; );
 is increasing in the stock of capital and the productivity and is decreasing in the
number of rms and in the xed cost: K = YKn > 0, n = Ynn =  (1 )AF=n < 0.
By Youngs Theorem, K = rn = YKn. Total operating prots in the economy are
(k; n;A; ) = n.
We have described a general rm level technology in which there is a clearly dened
optimal scale of production for rms which depends on the underlying technology
and rms have the text-book cost curves with rising marginal costs and a U shaped
average cost curve. The role of rms is to dene the way factor inputs are divided
up, and hence how e¢ ciently they are combined. More rms means that capital and
labour are divided up into smaller units, with the e¤ect that their marginal products
will increase but the additional xed overheads may reduce or increase total output.
2.4 General Equilibrium.
The balance sheet for households equates the value of equity holdings to the total
value of rms in terms of their assets (capital) plus the NPV of future prots:
V (t) =
Z n(t)
0
[k(t) + q(t)] di = K(t) + n(t)q(t);
so that we can we can characterize the change in the value of equity as
_V = _K + n(t) _q + _nq(t)  Z(t);
where _nq(t)  Z(t) reects the impact of entry/exit on total equity value. Hence
_K = _V   n(t) _q   _nq(t) + Z(t): (19)
From equations (1), (14), (4), (12), we have
_K = rK + w + n   
2
e2   C;
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and the aggregate accumulation equation for capital is:
_K = n

AF

K
n
;
1
n

  

  C    e
2
2
; (20)
which is equivalent to the product market equilibrium equation
Y (t) = C(t) + I(t) + Z(t);
where I(t) = _K. That is, output is equal to consumption plus investment in capital
plus "investment" Z(t) in setting up or dismantling rms.
The households transversality condition (3) can be related to (K(t); n(t)) by
noting that as ; limt!1 q(t) = 0. Since (K(t); n(t)) are strictly positive we therefore
have
lim
t!1
e tU 0 (C(t))n(t)q(t) = lim
t!1
e tU 0 (C(t))K(t) = 0: (21)
Denition: Equilibrium. . The general equilibrium is dened by the aggregate
variables (C(t); K(t); Y (t); V (t)), factor prices (r(t); w(t)), and the number and
rate of change of rms (n(t); e(t)), for 0  t <1 such that:
1. households determine C(t) and V (t) by maximizing lifetime utility subject to
(1; 3) given the factor prices;
2. incumbent rms choose (k(t); l(t); y(t)) by maximizing prots, given factor
prices;
3. the ow of entry (exit) e(t) = _n(t) equates the cost of entry (exit) with the NPV
of an incumbent rm;
4. Trajectories (K(t); n(t)) satisfy the transversality condition (21)
5. the factor prices ensure goods and factor markets clear.
The aggregate variables (C(t); K(t); e(t); n(t)) are determined jointly from the
four ODEs (2), (16), (20) and (4), the initial conditions K(0) and n(0) and the
transversality conditions. From these we can determine rm level variables k(t) and
l(t), and rm size y(t).
The general equilibrium model is equivalent to a centralized economy model in
which a social planner maximizes the intertemporal utility function by choosing the
path of aggregate consumption and entry (C; e) subject to the economy wide con-
straints, equations (20) and (4). The social planners problem is described in Ap-
pendix 1.
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2.5 Steady-State Equilibrium.
If we restrict the equilibria to the set of positive levels for the capital stock and the
number of rms, K and n, there will be a unique stationary equilibrium point such
that the transversality conditions holds. The steady-state aggregate capital stock and
the number of rms, (K; n), will be determined by equating the marginal product
of capital to the discount rate and setting prots equal to zero:
 = r(K; n; A); (22)
0 = (K; n; A; ): (23)
Hence, there will be no entry
e = 0: (24)
and aggregate consumption C will be equal to aggregate output
C = Y  = ny: (25)
Since prots are zero, rm size will be equal to the e¢ cient level y = ye, with the
corresponding levels of inputs.
The steady state has intuitively simple properties. Since consumption is constant,
the real rate of interest is equal to the consumersrate of time preference (22); long
run prots and the entry ow are zero (23,24) which implies that rms are producing
at minimum average-cost; consumption is constant and equal to aggregate output
(25). Given the Inada property of the production function the steady state exists
and, given global concavity, is unique.
Observe that the steady state depends on the technology parameters (A; ), the
rate of time preference  but not on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution () and
DBE (). Changes in the last two parameters only inuence the adjustment dynamics
since they determine intertemporal arbitrages (postponement of consumption and of
entry).
Figure 2
To solve for the steady state in levels, note that the equations are recursive. The
rst two equations can be solved for (K;n), which then determines consumption by
(25). We can make a geometrical projection of the phase diagram into (K;n)-space
as in gure 2. The two steady-state equilibrium conditions (22; 23)are invariant to
the control variables (C; e) and the parameter . Their slopes are
dn
dK

r=
=  rK
rn
> 0;
dn
dK

=0
=  K
n
> 0; (26)
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hence:
dn
dK

=0
  dn
dK

r=
=
nrK   Krn
rnn
< 0:
That is, they are both upward sloping but the r =  line is steeper 6 . These two
curves act as xed reference points to which we can relate the elements dening the
trajectories projected in (K;n). They are also coincident with the projections of the
isoclines _C = 0 and _e = 0 if all the variables are at their steady state levels 7.
In gure 2, to the left of the r =  line r >  and hence _C > 0 to the right r < 
and _C < 0. Also, above the  = 0 line we have  < 0 and below it  > 0. Recall,
from (10) we cannot infer the ow of entry from the instantaneous ow of prots ,
since entry/exit is determined by the NPV for the subsequent trajectory.
3 Aggregate dynamics
Next, we will characterize qualitatively the local dynamics properties in a neighbour-
hood of the steady state, by studying the solution of the linearized system0BB@
_C
_e
_K
_n
1CCA =
0BB@
0 0 CrK= Crn=
0  K= n=
 1 0  0
0 1 0 0
1CCA
0BB@
C(t)  C
e(t)
K(t) K
n(t)  n
1CCA (27)
given the initial conditions (n0;K0) and the transversality conditions (21), where the
Jacobian matrix is denoted by J .
3.1 The stable manifold.
Our rst step is to determine the eigenvalues.
Proposition 1 The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of system (27) are given
by
j1 =

2


2
2
  1
2

CrK

+
n


  1
2

1
2
 1
2
j = s; u (28)
j2 =

2


2
2
  1
2

CrK

+
n


+
1
2

1
2
 1
2
j = s; u (29)
6Observe that nrK Krnrnn =  
FkkFll F 2kl
(1 )2FFk .
7These isoclines will slidein (K;n) space when variables deviate from their steady-state values.
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where the discriminant is  =

CrK

  n

2
+ 4Crn

K

> 0, and the superscripts u; s
refer to stable and unstable eigenvalues. Hence we have:
s2 < 
s
1 < 0 < 
u
1 < 
u
2 ; (30)
All proofs are in Appendix 2. Note that s1 + 
u
1 = 
s
2 + 
u
2 = . It is sometimes
useful to deal with the products of the eigenvalues: let li  siui for i = 1; 2, then
l1 =
1
2

CrK

+
n

+
1
2

; l2 =
1
2

CrK

+
n

  12

; (31)
then 0 > l1 > l2, l1 + l2 = CrK +
n

< 0 and l1l2 = det(J) > 0.
For subsequent analysis, it is useful to examine what happens to the negative
eigenvalues as the dynamic barriers to entry (DBE)  vary:
Corollary 1 s2 and 
s
1 are increasing functions of the dynamic barriers to entry,
 : for s1 we have the limits
lim
!0+
s1 =
1
2
"
 

2 + 4
C


rnk   rKn
n
1=2#
< 0 < lim
!1
s1 = 0;
and for s2
lim
!0+
s2 =  1 < lim
!1
s2 =
1
2
"
 

2   4CrK

1=2#
< 0:
In terms of li we have
lim
!0+
l1 =
C


rnk   rKn
n

< 0 < lim
!1
l1 = 0;
lim
!0+
l2 =  1 < lim
!1
l2 =
CrK

< 0:
In the limiting cases of no entry ( =1) and costless entry ( = 0) the dimension
of the stable manifold collapses to 1: with  = 1 we have a zero eigenvalue, and
when  = 0 we have only one state variable. The speed of convergence is decreasing
in  for 0 <  <1.
We have four distinct real eigenvalues: the two negative eigenvalues s2 < 
s
1 < 0
will determine the dynamics for the transversality condition to hold. In our model
though the dynamics are saddle-path stable, the stable manifold is two-dimensional.
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Since the dimension of the stable manifold equals the number of the predetermined
variables the equilibrium is determinate.
The meaning of a two-dimensional stable manifold is that there are two indepen-
dent sources of stability. If we look at the terms in the formula for the eigenvalues,
we see parameters (; ) which reect consumer time preference,  which relates the
ow of entry to the cost of entry, and (rK ; rn; n) the e¤ect of the state variables
on the marginal products (which depend only on technological parameters). The
diminishing marginal returns of capital and decreasing prots to entry are the main
forces for stability in this economy. It should be noted that they also interact: an
increase in the number of rms increases the marginal productivity of capital; more
rms means less capital per rm and hence a higher marginal product since  < 1.
An increase in the capital stock makes rms more protable which a¤ects entry. As
we shall see, these interactions can lead to non-monotonic trajectories.
In the Appendix 2, Lemma A2, we show that the dynamics of the system along
the linearized stable manifold take the form:0BB@
C(t)  C
e(t)  0
K(t) K
n(t)  n
1CCA = P s1ws1es1t + P s2ws2es2t (32)
where wsi are the weights (determined by the initial conditions for the state variables,
K(0) and n(0)), and P si are the eigenvectors associated to the negative eigenvalues,
si and are obtained in Lemma A1.
The linear space tangent to the stable manifold Es is a 2-dimensional linear space
in (C; e;K; n) given by
Es  f (C; e;K; n) : C   C = hC(K  K; n  n); e = he(K  K; n  n) g
where hC and he are linear functions,
hC =

u2   u1
l2   l1

CrK

  u1u2

(K  K) + Crn

(n  n)

;
he =

s2   s1
l2   l1

n

  s1s2

(K  K) + K

(n  n)

;
where the coe¢ cients forK are both positive and for n are both negative. This means
that, all e¤ects considered, consumption and entry are positively related to the stock
of physical capital and negatively related with the number of rms, in the transition
to the steady state.
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3.2 The Phase Diagram in (K;n)
The fact that the system is 4-dimensional, and the stable manifold is 2-dimensional,
poses some challenges to a qualitative understanding of the dynamics of transition.
However, we can understand it intuitively by concentrating on the projection onto the
state-space (K;n), although there are insights to be gained by looking at the more
familiar "Ramsey" projection (C;K).
We denote by Es1 and E
s
2 the lines in the four dimensional space (C; e;K; n) which
have the slope given by P s1 and P
s
2 , respectively, and pass through the equilibrium
point. The 1-dimensional lines Es1 and E
s
2 span the space which is tangent to the
stable manifold at the steady state equilibrium, Es.
In order to determine Es1 (E
s
2) we set w
s
2 = 0 (w
s
1 = 0) which implies that the
dynamics is solely driven by s1 (
s
2). Hence:
Es1 := f(C; e;K; n) :
C   C
n  n =
u1   Crn
l1   CrK ;
e
n  n = 
s
1;
K  K
n  n =
Crn
l1   CrK g;
and
Es2 := f(C; e;K; n) :
C   C
n  n =
u2   Crn
l2   CrK ;
e
n  n = 
s
2;
K  K
n  n =
Crn
l2   CrK g;
evaluated in a neighborhood of the steady state. The dynamics of the system are
driven by these two lines. When the system is close to the steady-state, the equilib-
rium trajectories are asymptotically tanget to Es1 and when further away the trajec-
tories are parallel to Es2. This corresponds to the intuitive notion that the dynamics
are driven at rst more by the negative eigenvalue which is larger in absolute value,
but that since this dies away more quickly the smaller eigenvalue predominates as
you approach steady state.
Proposition 2 Qualitative characterization of the orbits belonging to the stable man-
ifold. Consider an initial non-steady-state point (C (0) ; e (0) ; n (0) ; K (0)).
The transition dynamics along the stable manifold will be as follows :
(a) If the initial position of the two state variables lies on Esi i = 1; 2, then the control
values jump to the corresponding values on Esi and the economy proceeds along
Es2 with maximum speed or E
s
1 with minimum speed to the steady-state
(b) If the initial position of the two state variables does not lie on either Esi , then
the economy will move in the direction of Es1 intially parrallel to E
s
2. Asymp-
totically it will approach steady-state asymptotically tangent to Es1.
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Figure 3 here
We can now describe the two projections of Esi ; i = 1; 2; in (K;n) and how they
relate to our two reference curves (see gure 3):
Proposition 3 The projections of Es1 and E
s
2 in (K;n):
(a) The projections have the opposite slopes:
dn
dK

Es1
=
l1   CrK
Crn
> 0;
dn
dK

Es2
=
l2   CrK
Crn
< 0:
(b) In general for  2 (0;1)
dn
dK

Es2
< 0 <
dn
dK

=0
<
dn
dK

Es1
<
dn
dK

r=
:
(c) if  ! 0 then
 1 = dn
dK

Es2
< 0 <
dn
dK

=0
=
dn
dK

Es1
<
dn
dK

r=
:
(d) if  !1 then
dn
dK

Es2
= 0 <
dn
dK

=0
<
dn
dK

Es1
=
dn
dK

r=
:
That is, in general the projection ofEs1 lies in between the two curves (r = ;  = 0),
and the projection of Es2 is negatively sloped. For  = 0 (instantaneous free
entry) Es2 is vertical and E
s
1 corresponds with the zero prot line. For  = 1
(xed number of rms), Es1 is coincident with the r =  curve and E
s
2 is horizontal.
Along with Proposition 2, Proposition 3 gives us the following simple dynamics for
the two limiting cases. When  = 0 (costless free entry as in Devereux et al. (1996),
Heijdra (1988) and Coto-Martinez and Dixon (2003)), the number of rms n "jumps"
down vertically (following Es1) to the  = 0 curve, and then (K;n) converge together
along the  = 0 curve. With an eigenvalue of s2 =  1 there is innite speed in the
adjustment of n, which in e¤ect collapses the manifold to the one dimension of  = 0.
When  = +1, the number of rms does not change: Thus we move horizontally
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along with K (the slope of Es1) accumulating or decumulating as in the standard
Ramsey story until we reach r = . There is a zero eigenvalue here, so there are
multiple equilibria: each point on r =  is a possible equilibrium, which has as a basin
of attraction the horizontal line passing through it. For a given n, there is a unique
K such that r =  : capital is accumulated or decumulated to reach that point, with
consumption moving up (down) with capital as in the Ramsey story. Again, for each
equilibrium there is a one dimensional saddlepath in (C; n) and (C;K).
We now focus on the general case where  2 (0;1). To describe the dynamics
in full, we need to introduce two new lines. These are the isoclines _K = 0 and _n = 0
linearized around the steady state. In general, these isoclines will depend upon (C; e)
and will not be invariant in (K;n). However, close to steady state these depend only
on (K;n) and hence can be used to characterize the equilibrium trajectories of the
linearized system. Note that along the _n = 0 line q = 0. This is because _n = e = 0
if and only if q = 0 (the net present value of incumbency is zero).
Proposition 4 The tangents to the isoclines _K = 0and _n = 0 passing through the
steady-state are
(a)
dn
dK

_n=0
=
K
s1
s
2   n
> 0;
(b)
dn
dK

_K=0
=
s1
s
2   CrK
CrK
> 0:
Figure 4 here
It is worth noting a few points about these isoclines. First, the _n = 0 has a
positive slope that is less than the zero-prot isocline. The _K = 0 is positive in slope,
and steeper than the r =  line. The reason for this is that entry (exit) a¤ects
capital accumulation. The further South from steady state we are, the higher the
ow of entry. From (20), higher entry means less is available for investment and
consumption, leading to less investment. Hence capital accumulation may stop even
though the marginal product of capital is above . The converse happens North of
the steady state. The _n = q = 0 line is atter than the  = 0 line. This is because
the NPV depends on the whole path of trajectories, not just the current ow of
prot. As we will see, entry can occur even when  < 0; because the rm anticipates
future prots. Exit can also occur when current prots are strictly positive, because
rms get out now to avoid future losses.
Fig 5
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Now we have the isoclines, we can divide up the (K;n) projection of the stable-
manifold into regions depending on the types of trajectories. We can see that any
trajectory which cuts the _K = 0 isocline must be vertical: any trajectory that cuts
the _n = 0 must be horizontal. Any trajectory to the left of the _K = 0 must have
capital increasing; any to the right decreasing. Any trajectory above the _n = 0 must
have the number of rms decreasing and any below must have the number increasing.
This enables us to intuitively draw the phase diagram in (K;n).
If we start in a region inbetween the iso-clines, then we have monotonic dynamics
in both variables. In region A we are to the right of the _K = 0 and above _n = 0, so
that both variables are declining. In region B, we are to the left of the _K = 0 and
below _n = 0; so that both variables are increasing. As the trajectories get close to
the steady-state, their slope will converge to that of Es1. We can treat the isoclines
themselves as part of A and B, since trajectories starting from the isoclines also share
the monotonicity.
In the regions outside A or B, we will in general get non-monotonic behaviour in
one variable: since the eigenvalues are real, we cannot have non-monotonic behaviour
in both variables along the same trajectory. If we are outside A and B, the only
instance in which both variables are monotonic is when the initial position lies on
Es2 : in this case the trajectory travels straight down E
s
2 to the steady state, and
the two state variables move in di¤erent directions (depending on whether they start
above or below steady-state). These two cases correspond to trajectories in which
only the larger negative eigenvalue 2 is active.
If we start from the regions strictly between _K = 0 and Es2, we will observe non-
monotonic behaviour in K. North West of the steady state we have the region Nk,
there are initially too many rms n > n, and capital may be above or below steady-
state. However, even if capital is above steady-state, the large number of rms boosts
the marginal product of capital and encourages capital accumulation. This continues
until the trajectory hits the _K = 0 isocline, and thenceforth enters region A and both
variables decline towards steady-state. In the region Sk, South/South-West the same
story happens, but we have too few rms: capital will initially fall since the marginal
product is low, until the _K = 0 is reached and the trajectory enters region B and
both state-variables increase to their steady state. Note that the regions Nk and Sk
are both open sets: they do not include their boundaries Es2 and _K = 0:
If we start from the region between Es2 and q = _n = 0, we will observe non-
monotonic behaviour in entry and hence n. To the West of steady state Wn, there is
too little capital. This means that rms have negative NPV (we are above the q = 0
line), so that there will be exit until the q = 0 line is reached and then both variables
enter region B and increase to steady-state. To the East of steady-state En, there is
too much capital: this boosts rms NPV and induces entry, until the q = 0 line is
met and the trajectory enters region A and both variables decline to the steady-state.
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Since the steady-state is almost always approached along Es1, almost all trajecto-
ries must either approach through region A or B where both are increasing/decreasing.
The only exception is where the initial position happens to lie on Es2. Hence, if the
initial position lies outside A [ B, the trajectory will move towards A [ B with one
variable decreasing and one increasing: once it enters A [ B the dynamics become
monotonic and there is a positive correlation between the state variables around the
steady state.
We can now see why the q = 0 line is atter than the  = 0. When the
trajectory reaches the q = 0 line on the edge of A and there is too much capital,
NPV = 0 despite  > 0 since the trajectory will cross the  = 0 line and subsequently
earn strictly negative prots until steady-state is reached. Along the q = 0 line, the
prots prior to reaching  = 0 are exactly o¤set by the subsequent losses. The
opposite holds true when the there is too little capital: the q = 0 line on the border
of B is reached even though  < 0. This is because the trajectory will cross the
 = 0 line and subsequently earn prots. Intuitively, we can think of  as representing
"short-run" prots and q as "long-run" prots, and as we cross the  = 0 and q = 0
lines, the correlation between them changes.
We can now formally summarise the above insights which we prove in the appen-
dix:
Proposition 5 Monotonous and non-monotonous transitional dynamics: Consider
the following two sub-sets
Nk 

(K;n) : n > n and
Crn
l2   CrK <
K  K
n  n <
Crn
s1
s
2   CrK

;(33)
Sk 

(K;n) : n < n and
Crn
l2   CrK >
K  K
n  n >
Crn
s1
s
2   CrK

;(34)
and
Wn 

(K;n) : K < K and
K
s1
s
2   n
<
n  n
K  K <
l2   CrK
Crn

;(35)
En 

(K;n) : K > K and
K
s1
s
2   n
>
n  n
K  K >
l2   CrK
Crn

:(36)
Then,
1. if (K(0); n(0)) 2 Nk [ Sk, then K(t) will adjust non-monotonically: it will
increase and then decrease if starting in Nk; it will decrease an then increase if
starting in Sk;
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2. if (K(0); n(0)) 2 Wn [ Rn, then n(t) will adjust monotonically; if starting in
Wn it will increase and then decrease; if starting in Rn it will increase and then
decrease;
3. if (K(0); n(0)) =2 Nk [ Sk [Wn [ Rn then both state variables have monotonic
trajectories.
3.3 Dynamics in (C;K) and (e; n)
Whilst the most intuition is gained by projecting the 4 dimensional phase space onto
(K;n), it is also illuminating to take a look at the conventional "Ramsey" projection
onto (C;K) and also (e; n).
Proposition 6 Projections of Esi onto (C;K) and (n; e) spaces.
(a) in (C;K)
dC
dK

Es2
= u2 > 
u
1 =
dC
dK

Es1
> 0:
(b) in (e; n)
de
dn

Es2
= s2 < 
s
1 =
de
dn

Es1
< 0:
In (C;K) for  2 (0;1), both Esi are upward sloping, so that consumption and
capital move together. From Corollary 1, in the limiting cases of  = 0, the slope of
Es2 becomes vertical and the slope of E
s
1 equals . In (e; n), for  2 (0;1) the slopes
are negative, with entry slowing as steady-state is approached. In the limiting case
of  =1, Es1 becomes vertical and the slope of Es2 negative. In this case the number
of rms is xed: n remains constant and e = 0 so there is no dynamics in (e; n) to
see. In the case of  = 0, Es2 is vertical and E
s
1 is negatively sloped. This means that
the number of rms jumps to the zero-prot line given K, and then n moves towards
steady-state.
Figure 6 here.
It is interesting to see what the dynamics of the non-monotonic trajectories look
like in terms of (C;K) space. The positive slopes of Esi mean that in general consump-
tion and capital move together. Hence, in the case of a trajectory in which capital
is non-monotonic, the trajectory of consumption will also be non-monotonic. Let us
take the case where the initial capital stock is at its steady-state value, but rms are
well above steady-state. This will induce the capital stock to increase initially, and
then decrease. Consumption will initially jump to a level below steady-state: this
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reects the fact that it has level of total assets below steady-state (in terms of capital
and rms the initial value is V (0) = qn(0) + K(0) with q < 0) and the household
wants to reduce the number of rms which it has. However, there is initially an in-
crease in capital: the large number of rms causes the marginal product of capital to
be high which leads to capital accumulation. Consumption and capital move together
with slope Es2. Eventually capital accumulation stops: this is when the trajectory in
(K;n) reaches the _K = 0 isocline. However, consumption continues to increase even
whilst capital is falling (this represents the part of the trajectory in (K;n) between
the _K = 0 isocline and the r =  line). Eventually capital and consumption both
fall together along a pth tangent to Es1. The non-monotonic trajectories with too
many rms will all share this pattern: consumption starts low and initially increases
with capital; there is a period when consumption continues to increase whilst capital
falls; nally both consumption and capital fall back down to steady-state. In the case
where there are too few rms, the opposite happens. Since q > 0, consumption jumps
above steady state. Initially it declines with capital tangentially to Es2; capital turns
around and starts to increase, for a period consumption continues to decline until
both approach the steady-state from below along Es1.
Figure 7 here
The projection on (e; n) is negatively sloped: the ow of entry is less when the
number of rms is larger. The slope of Es2 is 
s
2 which is larger than E
s
1 which is
associated with the smaller eigenvalue. The standard monotone dynamic is for e to
jump and then decline rapidly at rst tangent to Es2 and then more slowly converge
along Es1 to the steady-state. The interesting story in (e; n) is what happens when the
trajectory of n is non-monotonic. Let us suppose that the number of rms starts o¤
in steady-state, but there is too much capital. This boosts the protability of rms
and encourages entry: e jumps and the number of rms increases. The trajectory
from the initial point is parallel to Es2: Eventually, due to the decline in capital stock
and the e¤ect of entry, q falls to zero and entry stops. Entry turns to exit and initially
the ow of exit increases, but then entry declines so that the trajectory approaches
steady-state along Es1.
3.4 Firm size dynamics.
Firm size dynamics along the stable manifold can be derived from the rm size equa-
tion, (17) if we substitute the dynamics for the aggregate capital stock and the number
of rms (32). In the neighborhood of the stationary equilibrium, the local dynamics
for the rm size is given as
y(t)  y = 1
1   (K(K(t) K
) + n(n(t)  n)) :
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Therefore, the loci in the diagram (K;n) such that the size of rms is invariant, i.e.,
y(t) = y is given by
dn
dK

_y=0
=  K
n
;
which is coincident with the the zero-prot line (K;n) = 0 (see gures 2 to 5).
Above that line we will have  < 0 and y(t) < y and below the line  > 0 and
y(t) > y below. Thus the current ow of prots perfectly captures the size of the
rm.
Using our previous analysis on the dynamics for the aggregate variables K and
n we also can describe in which situations the dynamics of rm size can be non-
monotonic. First, we dene some extra subsets on the space (K;n):
Wy 

(K;n) : K < K and   K
n
<
n  n
K  K <
K
s1
s
2   n

(37)
Ey 

(K;n) : K > K and   K
n
>
n  n
K  K >
K
s1
s
2   n

(38)
Proposition 7 Monotonous and non-monotonous transitional dynamics for the rm
size:
(a) if (K(0); n(0)) 2 Wn [Wy [En [Ey then y(t) will adjust non-monotonically: it
will increase and then decrease if starting in Wn[Wy; it will decrease and then
increase if starting in En [ Ey:
(b) if (K(0); n(0)) =2 Wn [Wy [ En [ Ey then y(t) will adjust monotonically.
Note that for 0 <  < 1 the non-monotonous adjustment of n is a su¢ cient
(but not necessary) condition for the non-monotonous adjustment of rm size. If
(K;n) belongs toWy (Ey) the transition path will cross line  = 0 in its way to being
tangent to Es1. This means that, though all the other variables vary monotonically,
the variation in the size of rms shifts direction from being (decreasing) increasing
to being decreasing (increasing). The dynamics for the size of rms will be similar
when (K;n) belongs toWn (En). But in this case the number of rms will also adjust
non-monotonically.
4 Application: Productivity and Fixed cost shocks.
In this section we derive the comparative dynamics results for an unanticipated per-
manent shock in productivity or in the xed costs. In general, a technology shock
would be a simultaneous shock to both parameters. However, we shall rst consider
each parameter on its own.
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4.1 Shock to A:
A positive shock to A has two e¤ects: it boosts the marginal productivity of capital
and labour, and it raises the protability of rms (and hence increases the marginal
product of an additional rm). In terms of Figure 1, an increase in A shifts both the
average and marginal cost downwards, but leaves their point of intersection the same
(as A does not a¤ect ye),
Proposition 8 Long-Run Multipliers for A. If there is a constant, permanent and
unanticipated increase in productivity:
@C
@A
> 0;
@K
@A
> 0;
@n
@A
> 0
At the rm level we have
@l
@A
< 0 =
@y
@A
<
@k
@A
In the long-run, a positive productivity shock in A leads to an increase in capital,
the number of rms and consumption. Entry is zero in steady-state by denition.
We can explore the long-run multiplier in terms of (K;n) space. An increase in A
a¤ects both the marginal product of capital and the protability of rms. However,
from (26) and the expressions for rK and rn, we can see that the slope of r =  is
una¤ected, so that there is a parallel shift to the right. Turning to the  = 0 locus,
from (26) and the expressions for K and n the schedule  = 0 has a parallel shift
upwards. This is intuitive: the slopes of the two curves depend on the ratios of
marginal e¤ects of (n;K) on (r; ): all these marginal e¤ects are proportional to A so
the e¤ects cancel out. That leaves just the direct e¤ect of A on the marginal product
of capital and prots resulting in the intuitive shifts in the loci.
The new steady state involves a di¤erent ratio of K to n. The increase in the
number of rms implies that given the inelastic labour force, the employment per
rm decreases. Since the e¢ cient output ye does not change (9), an increase in A
implies an increase in the steady-state capital per rm k = K=n. Graphically, the
steady-state after the increase in A lies on a ray from the origin that is steeper: indeed
as we vary A from 0 to 1, the zero-prot capital per rm varies from 1 to zero.
These two equations are every powerful: they are independent of the dynamics of
the system but tie down the steady-state. The initial steady state must lie to the
left of the new r =  line and below the  = 0 line, hence it is in the region of
monotonic trajectories: both capital and the number of rms will increase towards
the new steady state.
Next, for the case of the two control variables, we can consider the di¤erence
between the impact e¤ect and the long-run e¤ect and the transition dynamics. For
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consumption, we need to dene critical values for the parameter pair (; ) according
to the function:
z(; )  u1u2( (u1 + u2)   ( + )) > 0:
From the eigenvalues stated in Proposition 1, z is increasing in both  and  :
furthermore, for both  and , as they tend to zero so does z; as they tend to
innity so does z. Hence, for any 	 2 R++, we can dene the upper-countour set
Q (	) = f(; ) : z (; )  	g
The upper-contour sets are closed and strictly convex in (; ).
Proposition 9 Impact-Multipliers on the two controls (C; e).
(a)
@c
@A
>
@c(0)
@A
=
n
(1  ) u1u2(u1 + u2   )

z (; )  
n

(b)
sgn

@C(0)
@A

= sgn

z (; )  
n

(c)
@e(0)
@A
> 0
e(t) > 0 for all t and tends to zero monotonically.
The result (a) means that given the values n 1, we can partition (; ) into
three sets in which consumption jumps up, jumps down or stays the same. Intuitively
there are two things going on behind this result. First, there is the trajectory of r 
over time: from (2) the bigger this gap is, the more the household will want to tilt
consumption to sacrice current for future consumption. This e¤ect is smaller when
 is larger. Secondly, there is entry (exit) which inuences how quickly r changes.
If  is larger, then entry is slower and r will converge to more quickly (due to the
e¤ect of n on r). Hence, if  and/or  are large, the household has less incentive to
tilt consumption away from the present and so consumption can increase on impact.
When viewed in (C;K) space, the e¤ect of entry is to shift up the projection of
the production-function Y (K;n;A) : Thus on impact there is an initial shift in the
production function, as in the Ramsey model. But, in our model, the impact increase
in aggregate output is a result of the increase in the size of rms, y(0), for a given
number of rms. However, this one-o¤productivity shock also triggers a ow of entry
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resulting in subsequent upward shifts in the projection of Y (K;n;A) as n converges
to its new steady state value. For a given time-path of K, the marginal product
of capital declines more slowly as the number of rms increases alongside it. At the
rm level, there is a reduction in size and a change in the factor composition, with
an increase in the average capital stock and a reduction in the average labour input.
4.2 Shock to 
Next we turn to a shock to the overhead . This operates in a very di¤erent way to
A, since it does not a¤ect marginal productivity and MC at all, but operates only
on average productivity and cost. An increase in  causes the average cost curve to
shift upwards, and hence raises the e¢ cient scale of production (see (7)). This means
that for a given capital stock, there will be fewer rms if each produces at e¢ cient
scale. In terms of (n;K), the change in  has no e¤ect on the r =  locus, since it
has no direct e¤ect on the marginal product of capital. An increase in  leads to a
downwards shift in the  = 0 line: for a given K, prots per-rm decline and so the
zero-prots occurs with fewer rms.
An increase in  causes a long run increase in the size of rms, because both
capital and employment per rm will increase. However, there is no e¤ect on rm
size on impact (since k; l cannot vary).
Proposition 10 Long-Run Multipliers for . If there is a constant, permanent and
unanticipated increase in the overhead xed cost:
(a)
@C
@
< 0;
@K
@
< 0;
@n
@
< 0:
(b) At the rm level we have
@y
@
;
@k
@
;
@l
@
> 0:
Proposition 11 The impact multipliers for .
(a)
@C(0)
@
=
n
z(; )

C(1  )
n2
  z(; )

>
@C
@
:
(b)
sgn

@C(0)
@A

= sgn

z (; )  C(1  )
n2

:
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(c)
@e(0)
@
< 0 :
The fact that an increase in  can cause an ambiguous impact on consumption
deserves some comment. Less output is produced (more is used up in overheads)
which tends to reduce consumption. However, the household also wants to decumulate
capital which boosts consumption: if  is low enough there will be an increase in
consumption. The household also wants to dismantle rms: this uses up resources
and tends to reduce consumption possibiltities. If  is high (it is going to cost a lot
to dismantle the rms) then consumption will tend to fall; if  is small enough then
it will boost consumption.
4.3 Correlated shocks in (A; ).
If we assume that the two technology parameters as uncorrelated, each one taken
on its own leads to a monotonic response of capital and the number of rms (the
resulting dynamics belonging to the regions A or B). However, if we take the two
parameters together, they span the whole space: given an initial steady-state, we can
create a new steady state in any direction by choosing an appropriate combination of
changes to (;A). Hence the whole range of dynamic responses is possible, including
the cases where one of the variables (K;n) is non-monotonic. It is thus possible for
two technological shocks which on their own provide for monotonic dynamics when
combined will give rise to non-monotonous behaviour. In this section we show that
if the two parameters are correlated (as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1991)) we can
determine when we get monotonic and non-monotinic dynamics.
Assume that the shocks to  are proportional to the shocks in A, such that d =
dA8. The long run multipliers for the stock of capital and the number of rms are:
dK
dA
=
@K
@A
+ 
@K
@
=
n



A(1  )   

;
dn
dA
=
@n
@A
+ 
@n
@
=
n


1
A
   (1  )


:
Let us concentrate on the cases in which there is a positive correlation between 
and A:  > 0. From Propositions 8 and 10, the long-run multipliers have opposite
signs:@K

@A
> 0, @n

@A
> 0, @K

@
< 0 and @n

@
< 0. Then, dK

dA
and dn

dA
are ambiguous and
depend on the magnitude of :
8The case for which  = 0 corresponds to the uncorrelated shocks in A and  which were studied
in the previous section.
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We assign K and n to the steady state after the shock and K(0) and n(0) the
steady state before the shock and set dK = K  K(0) and dn = n   n(0); next we
compute
dn
dK
() =
dn=dA
dK=dA
(39)
and draw upon our study on local dynamics to determine critical values of  and
relate them to the projection of the phase diagram in the space (K;n): we can have
dynamics related to the regions A;B;Wy;Wn; Nk in gure 4.
From the values of  we can infer both the value of the long run multipliers and the
type of transitional dynamics. We can get lots of results (see Lemma 3 in Appendix
2), but the following seems to be the most pertinent:
Proposition 12 There are values for , 0 <  < n such that there will be
an increase in the aggregate capital, in the number of rms and in the size of rms.
Within this interval, y will adjust non-monotonically, and n will adjust monotonically
(non-monotonically) if 0 <  < 1 (if 1 <  < n).
Example In order to illustrate this and other cases we consider particular func-
tions: a Cobb-Douglas production function F (k; l) = F (K=n; 1=n) = (K=n)(1=n)
where  = + and 0 <  < 1, and a CRRA utility function u(C) = C
1  1
1  where  >
0. In this case, the equilibrium number of rms is n = L (A(=)(=(1  )) 1)1=
and we nd that 0 =

A
, 1 =

A

ns1
s
2+
ns1
s
2(1 )+

, n =

A(1 ) , 2 =

A(1 )

2+l2
l2

, K =

A(1 ) , and 3 =

A

s1
s
2+
2
s1
s
2(1 )

.
Figures 8-14 here
Figures 8 to 15 display the trajectories for aggregate variables C, e, K and n and rm
level variables K=n and y that were built with the following benchmark parameter
values: L = 1,  = 0:4,  = 0:5,  = 0:03,  = 2, A = 1,  = 1 and an initial value
for  = 0:03. In Figure 8 we consider a 10% increase in A;in Figure 9 a 10% increase
in . Figures 10-15 deal with the correlated case, where there is a 10% increase in
A and a corresponding change in : the critical correlations (see Lemma A3, proof
of Proposition 12) are 0 = 0:03, 1  0:0375, n = :05, 2  0:1345, K = 0:3 and
3  0:9866. As we can see, these provide examples of all types of trajectories: all
variables monotonic (Figure 11, 12), non-monotonic in n (Figure 10), non-monotonic
in K with a drop in consumption on impact followed by overshooting (Figure 13,14),
and without overshootong (Figure 15).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we extend the Ramsey model and generalize existing approaches to
entry by allowing for an explicit and fully transparent treatment of both the number
and output per rm at the micro level along with the behaviour of aggregate output,
consumption and investment. We do this by allowing for an explicit treatment of
two state variables: capital and the number of rms. This contrasts with existing
models which try to keep the number of state variables to one: either by allowing for
the number of rms to vary but with no capital, or having instantaneous free entry,
or a xed number of rms. The reward for this additional complexity is that we can
have a richer dynamic behavior. In particular, we can get non-monotonic behavior
in either one of the state variables (but not both since we have only real eigenvalues)
resulting form the interaction of the state variables on each othersmarginal prod-
uct. We consider the dynamics induced by two types of technology shocks in this
model (productivity and xed cost) and show how they can generate non-monotonic
responses if they are correlated.
We believe that entry and exit have long been the Cinderella of dynamic general
equilibrium analysis. This has largely been due to the technical di¢ culty of making
the number of rms endogenous in a non-trivial way. We show how by adopting the
dynamic entry model of Datta and Dixon (2002), it is possible to develop an intuitive
and tractable dynamic general equilibrium model with the two state variables. Fur-
thermore, although the model is inherently a four dimensional system, the model can
be represented graphically in two dimensions by projecting it onto the 2-dimensional
subspace of the state variables.
There are several ways to develop the model in this paper. Most obviously, we can
allow for imperfect competition, so that the long-run equilibrium is no longer optimal:
in steady state the zero prot condition will imply that average cost is greater than
marginal cost, so that we have the standard Chamberlin-Robinson excess capacity
result.
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6 Appendix 1: The Social Planners Problem.
The social planners problem is to choose f(C(t); e(t)); t 2 [0;1)g to solve
max
fC;eg
Z +1
0
U(C)e tdt (40)
subject to
_K = n

AF (
K
n
;
1
n
)  

  C    e
2
2
(41)
_n = e (42)
As both the utility function and the constraints of the problem are concave functions
of the controls, then (if the transversality conditions hold) the Pontriyagin maximum
principle will give us necessary and su¢ cient conditions for optimality. The current
value Hamiltonian is,
H  U(C) + p1

n

AF (
K
n
;
1
n
)  

  C    e
2
2

+ p2e
which is maximized by the optimal values for consumption and entry (C^, e^), such
that
Hc = U
0(C^)  p1 = 0 (43)
He =  e^p1 + p2 = 0: (44)
Then the optimal policy functions are
C^ = C(p1); C
0 < 0
e^ =
p2
p1
:
The canonical equations are
_p1 = p1  HK = p1(  AFK) (45)
_p2 = p2  Hn = p2  p1 [AF (1  )  ] : (46)
If we time-di¤erentiate (43), using (45), and time-di¤erentiate the log of equation
(44), we obtain an equivalent modied Hamiltonian dynamic system (after dropping
the hats for notational simplicity):
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_C =   C
(C)
(  r(K;n;A)) (47)
_e = er(K;n;A)  (K;n;A; )

(48)
_K = n

AF (
K
n
;
1
n
)  

  C    e
2
2
(49)
_n = e (50)
given K(0) = K0, n(0) = n0 and the transversality conditions. These equations are
exactly the same as the decentralised equilibrium outlined in the text. The only non-
obvious translation is for NPV of rms: dene q  p2
p1
(from 44), hence (48) becomes
(14).
7 Appendix 2: Proofs.
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The characteristic polynomial of the jacobian matrix is c() = 4   23 +M22  
(M2   2) + M4, where M2 and M4 are the sum of the principal minors of or-
der 2 and 4 of the jacobian J , where M2 = 2 + CrK +
n

and M4 = det(J) =
C

(rKn   rnK). The characteristic polynomial can be equivalently written as
c() =
 

2
4
(w2 + a1w + a0), where
w 

  
2
2 
2
 2
; (51)
and a1 
 

2
 2
(M2 2) 2 and a0   a1+
 

2
 4
M4 1. Then c() = 0 if and only if
w2+a1w+a0 = 0. The roots of this polynomial on w are w1;2 =  a12 
 
a1
2
2   a0 12 .
If we substitute the expressions for the coe¢ cients a1 and a0 we get

2

w1;2 =

2
2
  1
2

CrK

+
n


 1
2
"
CrK

  n

2
+ 4
Crn

K

# 1
2
:
Then, solving equation (51) for  we get the eigenvalues as
 
  
2
s;u
1;2
=   
2

w1;2
 1
2
which is equivalent to equations (28)-(29).
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Next we demonstrate that the eigenvalues are real and satisfy (30). Recall that
rK < 0, rn > 0, n < 0 and K > 0. Then CrK +
m

< 0. The determinant of the Jaco-
bian J , which is equal to the sum of the principal minors of order 4,M4; is positive, as
det(J) = c

(nrK   Krn) = C
 
A
n
2 FKKFLL F 2KL
n2

> 0. Additionally the discrimi-
nant is positive, as =

CrK

+ m

2
 4 det(J) =

CrK

  n

2
+4 cC

Krn > 0, which
implies that 
1
2 is real and positive. It also implies that 1
2

crK

+ n


+ 1
2

1
2 < 0 and
that
 

2
2   1
2

crK

+ n


  1
2

1
2 >
 

2
2
> 0. Then
h 

2
2   1
2

crK

+ n


  1
2

1
2
i 1
2
is positive and real and larger than 
2
. Therefore the eigenvalues, given in equations
(28)-(29), are real and verify equation (30). QED.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
This proof starts with two Lemmas, A1 and A2.
Lemma A1 The (transposed) eigenvectors associated to matrix J have the generic
form
P ji =
"
(  ji )Crn
li   CrK
; ji ;
Crn

li   CrK
; 1
#T
; j = s; u; i = 1; 2 (52)
where l1   CrK > 0 and l2   CrK < 0, for any value of the parameters.
Proof Eigenvector P ji in equation (52) is obtained in the usual way, as the non-
zero solution of the homogeneous system (J   jiI4)P ji = 0 for j = s; u and i = 1; 2.
As
l1   CrK

=  1
2
0@CrK

  n

 
"
CrK

  n

2
+ 4
C

Krn
# 1
2
1A
>  1
2
0@CrK

  n

 
"
CrK

  n

2# 121A
=  1
2

CrK

  n

 
CrK   n

=
(
0 if 0 > CrK

> n

n

  CrK

 0 if 0 > n

 CrK

;
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and
l2   CrK

=  1
2
0@CrK

  n

+
"
CrK

  n

2
+ 4
C

Krn
# 1
2
1A
<  1
2
0@CrK

  n

+
"
CrK

  n

2# 121A
=  1
2

CrK

  n

+
CrK   n

=
(
n

  CrK

 0 if 0 > CrK

 n

0 if 0 > n

> CrK

;
then l1   CrK > 0 and l2   CrK < 0.
QED
Corollary A1 The eigenvectors associated with the negative eigenvalues s1 and 
s
2
are
P s1 =

u1Crn
l1   CrK ; 
s
1;
Crn
l1   CrK ; 1
T
;
P s2 =

u2Crn
l2   CrK ; 
s
2;
Crn
l2   CrK ; 1
T
:
Lemma A2 The orbits, belonging to the space tangent to the stable manifold, are
determined from: 0BB@
C(t)  C
e(t)  0
K(t) K
n(t)  n
1CCA = P s1ws1es1t + P s2ws2es2t (53)
where
ws1 =
l1   CrK
l2   l1
" 
l2   CrK
Crn

!
(K(0) K)  (n(0)  n)
#
; (54)
ws2 =
l2   CrK
l2   l1
"
 
 
l1   CrK
Crn

!
(K(0) K) + (n(0)  n)
#
: (55)
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Proof. Let x = (x1(t); x2(t); x3(t); x4(t))T  (C(t)   C; e(t); K(t)   K; n(t)  
n)T . Then, from the Hartman-Grobman theorem, (Guckenheimer and Holmes, 1990,
p. 13), the local dynamics is topologically equivalent to the solution of the linear
system _x(t) = Jx(t). The eigenvalues and the eigenvector matrix associated to J
where already determined. Let P = [P u2 P
u
1 P
s
1P
s
2 ] where Consider the vector q =
(qu2 ; q
u
1 ; q
s
1; q
2
2) such that x = Pq. It is well know that, if we take the time derivatives
of w and substitute _x we get the product system _q(t) = q(t), where  = P 1JP
is the Jordan matrix of J . Therefore,  = diag(u2 ; 
u
1 ; 
s
1; 
s
2). This system has the
solution qui (t) = w
u
i e
ui t, qsi (t) = w
s
i e
si t for i = 1; 2, where wsi and w
u
i are arbitrary
constants. There is conditional convergence towards the steady state, if we set wu1 =
wu2 = 0. If we perform the inverse transformation (which is always possible because
the eigenvector matrix is non singular) we get the trajectories along the saddle, given
by equation (53).
If we assume that we know K(t) K and n(t)  n at time t, then we get
ws1e
s1t =
K(t) K   P s2 (3)(n(t)  n)
P s1 (3)  P s2 (3)
(56)
ws2e
s2t =
 (K(t) K) + P s1 (3)(n(t)  n)
P s1 (3)  P s2 (3)
: (57)
As we usually know the initial values of the state variables, at time t = 0, then we
get equations (54) and (55), if we substitute the appropriate elements of P s1 and P
s
2 .
QED.
Corollary A2 The linear space tangent to the stable manifold Es is a 2-dimensional
linear space in (C; e;K; n) given by
Es  f (C; e;K; n) : C   C = hC(K  K; n  n); e = he(K  K; n  n) g
where hC and he are linear functions,
hC =

u2   u1
l2   l1

CrK

  u1u2

(K  K) + Crn

(n  n)

;
he =

s2   s1
l2   l1

n

  s1s2

(K  K) + n

(n  n)

;
Proof. If we substitute equation (53 ) for the non-predetermined variables C
and e the expressions for ws1e
s1t and ws2e
s2t given by (56) and (57) then we get a
2-dimensional linear manifold which expresses the functional dependence with the
state variables, along the stable manifold, Es. QED
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7.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
From Proposition 2, we can use the denition of the schedules ws1 = 0 and w
s
2 = 0
to characterize the dynamics in the space (C; e;K; n) relative to the lines Es1 and E
s
2.
From Lemma A2, we get
dn
dK

Es1
==
1
P s1 (3)
=
l1   CrK
Crn
> 0:
and
dn
dK

Es2
=
1
P s2 (3)
=
l2   CrK
Crn
< 0
As Es1 is associated with w
s
2 = 0 and E
s
2 with w
s
1 = 0 QED
7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
If we consider equations (20) and (14) we see that the isoclines _K = 0 and _n = 0
depend on the control variables C and e, which depend on the K and n, and therefore
their projections in (K;n) are always shifting. But, we can determine loci in the
space (K;n) which are analogous to the isoclines in a two-dimensional model: we
can determine the loci where the trajectory belonging to the approximation to the
stable manifold change direction, that is the slope of (n   n)=(K   K) such that
d(K(t) K)=dt = 0 and the slope of (n n)=(K K) such that d(n(t) n)=dt = 0.
Consider equation (53): then d(n(t)  n)=dt = 0 if and only if
s1w
s
1e
s1t + s2w
s
2e
s2t = 0:
As e
s
1t  0 and es2t  0 for any 0  t < 1, then a necessary condition is that
sign(ws1) 6= sign(ws2). Then e(
s
2 s1)t =  s1ws1
s2w
s
2
or, equivalently, we can nd a critical
time tn = 1s2 s1 ln

 s1ws1
s2w
s
2

. If we substitute one of these expressions in equations
(53) we get
n(t)  n =

s2   1s
s2

ws1e
s1t;
K(t) K = Crnw
s
1
s2
 
s2
l1   Crn
 
!
e
s
1t;
Substituting in equations (54) and (55) and determining the ratio we get
n(t)  n
K(t) K =  
(s2   s1)(l1   Crn=)(l2   Crn=)
Crn

(s2(l1   Crn=)  s1(l2   Crn=))
:
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As (l1  Crn=)(l2  Crn=) =  CrnK= and s2(l1  Crn=)  s1(l2  Crn=) =
(s1   s2)(n=   s1s2) then we get equation (a).
We proceed in an analogous way to determine equation (b). From equation (53):
then d(K(t) K)=dt = 0 if and only if
s1w
s
1

Crn=
l1   CrK=

e
s
1t + s2w
s
2

Crn=
l2   CrK=

e
s
2t = 0:
Then e(
s
2 s1)t =  s1ws1(l2 CrK=)
s2w
s
2(l1 CrK=) , so that
n(t)  n
K(t) K =
1
s2   s1

s2(l1   CrK=)
Crn=
  
s
1(l2   CrK=)
Crn=

;
which, after some algebra leads to the result stated. QED
7.5 Proof of Proposition 5.
(1) Consider Lemma A2: as e
s
1t  0 and es2t  0 for any t 2 R+, if sign(ws1) =
sign(ws2) then n(t) will converge monotonically towards the steady state n
. If they
are positive (negative) n(t) will decrease (increase). If sign(ws1) 6= sign(ws2) then
n(t) n may change sign along the transition and, therefore, have a non-monotonous
behavior. If this is the case then there will be a combination of parameters, of the
initial data such that d(n(t) n
)
dt
= 0 for a particular time tn. If this is the case then
e(
s
2 s1)t =  s1ws1
s2w
s
2
or, equivalently t = 1
s2 s1 ln

 s1ws1
s2w
s
2

. If there are conditions under
which t  0 then we denote it by tn. As s2   s1 < 0 then a critical time exists if
s1w
s
1
s2w
s
2
  1, which is equivalent to
s1w
s
1 + 
s
2w
s
2 > 0 and w
s
2 < 0; w
s
1 > 0
s1w
s
1 + 
s
2w
s
2 < 0 and w
s
2 > 0; w
s
1 < 0
:
After some algebra we get the equivalent condition(
n(0) n
K(0) K <
K
s1
s
2 n and w
s
2 < 0; w
s
1 > 0
n(0) n
K(0) K >
K
s1
s
2 n and w
s
2 > 0; w
s
1 < 0:
: (58)
This gives only a necessary condition. That is, if the conditions in equation (58) hold
then there is a critical time
tn =
1
s2   s1
ln

 
s
1w
s
1
s2w
s
2

 0;
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such that d
dt
(n(t)  n)
t=tn
= 0. If not, then d
dt
(n(t)  n) 6= 0 for any 0  t <1.
At time t = tn  0 we get the values of the state variables as
n(tn)  n =

s2   s1
s2

ws1e
s1tn
K(tn) K =

s1
s
2   n
K

s2   s1
s2

ws1e
s1tn
by substituting e(
s
2 s1)t =  s1ws1
s2w
s
2
into equations (54) and (55). In the (K;n)-space
the locus where d
dt
(n(t)  n) = 0, is then given by
n  n
K  K =
n(tn)  n
K(tn) K =
K
s1
s
2   n
> 0 (59)
Which is of course the _n = 0 isocline dened in Proposition 4.
Therefore, if ws1 < 0, if w
s
2 > 0 (i.e., in theWn) and if
n(0) n
K(0) K >
K
s1
s
2 n then the
number of rms will fall until t = tn, where it crosses the ddt(n(t)  n) = 0 line and
increases afterwards. It will cutwith a positive slope curve (K;n) = 0 and will be
asymptotically tangent to the Es1 projection. If w
s
1 < 0, if w
s
2 > 0 (that is, in the same
quadrant) but if n(0) n

K(0) K <
K
s1
s
2 n then (n(t)   n
) < 0, d
dt
(n(t)   n) > 0 for any
value of 0  t < 1 and limt!1 ddt(n(t)   n) = 0 and n will monotonously increase
towards n. We can make the same reasoning as regarding the quadrant En: (a) If
ws1 > 0, if w
s
2 < 0 and
n(0) n
K(0) K <
K
s1
s
2 n then the number of rms will increase until
t = tn, where it crosses the ddt(n(t)  n) = 0 line and decreases afterwards, crossing
with a positive slope the curve (K;n) = 0 and becoming tangent asymptotically to
the Es1 projection. If w
s
1 > 0, if w
s
2 < 0 but if
n(0) n
K(0) K >
K
s1
s
2 n then (n(t) n
) > 0,
d
dt
(n(t)   n) < 0 for any value of 0  t < 1 limt!1 @@t(n(t)   n) = 0 and n will
monotonously decrease towards n.
(2). Consider equation (53): as e
s
1t  0 and es2t  0 for any t 2 R+, and
as Crn
l1 CrK > 0 and
Crn
l2 CrK < 0 then sign(w
s
1) = sign(w
s
2) then K(t) will converge
monotonically towards the steady stateK. If ws1 > 0 and w
s
2 < 0 (w
s
1 < 0 and w
s
2 > 0)
thenK(t) will decrease (increase) monotonically towardsK. This is what happens in
quadrants Wn and En. If we are in quadrants Nk or Sk, where sign(ws1) = sign(w
s
2),
then K(t)   K may change sign along the transition and, therefore, have a non-
monotonous behavior. In order to determine the conditions and the loci in which we
may have d
dt
(K(t) K) = 0, we follow the same procedure as in the previous case.
If (
n(0) n
K(0) K <
s1
s
2 CrK
Crn
and ws1 < 0; w
s
2 < 0
n(0) n
K(0) K >
s1
s
2 CrK
Crn
and ws1 > 0; w
s
2 > 0
; (60)
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then there is a critical time
tK =
1
s2   s1
ln

 
s
1w
s
1(l2   CrK)
s2w
s
2(l1   CrK)

 0;
such that d
dt
(K(t) K)
t=tK
= 0, and substituting the critical time in equations
(54,55) we get the set of values for (K;n) such that this condition holds,
n  n
K  K =
n(tK)  n
K(tK) K =
s1
s
2   CrK
Crn
: (61)
We can make the same reasoning as for the case of n to see that, if the initial
and steady state values for the state variables (K(0); n(0)) and (K; n) verify the
conditions given by equation (60) then the saddle path will cut the line given by
equation (61) at time tK , changing the direction of evolution of the K variable, after
a while it will cross line r(K;n) =  and will converge asymptotically to (K; n).
If conditions given by equation (60) do not hold, then d
dt
(K(t)   K) 6= 0 for any
0  t <1 and the adjustment of K will be monotonic. Those conditions hold in the
areas Nk and Sk given analytically in equations (33) and (34): in the rst case K will
decrease until it reaches the _K = 0 line and increases afterwards, and in the second
case it has the opposite evolution. QED
7.6 Proofs of Propositions 6-9
Proof of proposition 6 If ws1 = 0, then from (54) and Lemmas A1-A2 the projec-
tions of Es2 are:
dC
dK

Es2
=
P s2 (1)
P s2 (3)
;
de
dn

Es2
=
P s2 (2)
P s2 (4)
;
yielding the values reported. Likewise for Es1. QED
Proof of Proposition 7. Analogous to Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 8
The long run multipliers, with all the variables evaluated at the steady state values
are
@K
@A
=  C(rAn   Arn)
 det(J)
=
C
nA det(J)
> 0;
@n
@A
=
C(rAK   ArK)
 det(J)
=  C(1  )A(FFkk   (Fk)
2)
n det(J)
> 0;
@C
@A
= 
@K
@A
+ nF =
2C
nA det(J)
+
n
A(1  ) > 0:
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As l = 1=n then @l=@A < 0 and as y = ye = =(1   ) then @y=@A = 0, which
means that @k=@A > 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 9
We have
@C(t)
@A
=
@C
@A
+
u1
l1   Crk!
s
1;Ae
s1t +
u2
l2   Crk!
s
2;Ae
s2t
for any t  0 where
!s1;A =
@!s1
@A
=
K
(l2   l1)

@K
@A
  Crn
l2   CrK
@n
@A

< 0 (62)
!s2;A =
@!s2
@A
=
K
(l2   l1)

@K
@A
  Crn
l1   CrK
@n
@A

: (63)
For time t = 0 we have
@C(0)
@A
=
@C
@A
+
u1
l1   CrK !
s
1;A +
u2
l2   CrK !
s
2;A =
=
@C
@A
+
u2   u1
l2   l1

u1
u
2
@K
@A
+
C

rA

using equation (62,63) and the fact that (l1 CrK)(l2 CrK) =  CrnK=. The
sign of the expression is ambiguous but as the second term is negative, we readily
conclude that @C(0)
@A
< @C(1)
@A
= @C

@A
. In order to sign @C(0)
@A
we further substitute @C

@A
to get
@C(0)
@A
=
1
x(; )A

u1
u
2

 C + (u1 + u2   )
n
1  

  C
n

=
=
n
(1  )x(; )A

z(; )  
n

where
z(; )  u1u2 ((u1 + u2)  ( + )) : (64)
As 
n
> 0 and as lim!0 z = 0 and lim!1 z =1 for any nite and positive , then
there is a critical value of , call it A, depending on  such that x(A; ) =

n
> 0.
In this case we have @c(0)
@A
= 0 The same reasoning can be made as regards .
For the case of entry,
@e(t)
@A
= s1!
s
1;Ae
s1t + s2!
s
2;Ae
s2t
=
K
(l2   l1)

s1

@K
@A
  Crn
l2   CrK
@n
@A

e
s
1t   s2

@K
@A
  Crn
l1   CrK
@n
@A

e
s
2t

;
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which is ambiguous for all t 2 [0;1) and @e(1)
@
= @e

@
= 0. Evaluating at time t = 0,
we get
@e(0)
@A
=
K
(l2   l1)

s1

@K
@A
  Crn
l2   CrK
@n
@A

  s2

@K
@A
  Crn
l1   CrK
@n
@A

=
=
s2   1s
l2   l1

A

+ 1s
2
s
@n
@A

> 0:
As this result is equivalent to s1!
s
1;A > 
s
2!
s
2;A and as e
s1t > e
s
2t for 0 < t <1 then
e(t) > 0 for 0  t <1. QED
7.7 Proof of Proposition 10.
(a) The long run multipliers, with all the variables evaluated at the steady state
values, for the state variables are:
@K
@
=
Crn
 det(J)
=  C(1  )
n det(J)
< 0 (65)
and
@n
@
=  rK
rn
@K
@
< 0:
For consumption we get
@C
@
= 
@K
@
  n < 0 (66)
(b) Note that y = ye dened in (7) which is increasing in . Capital per rm
can be derived from part (a).
QED
7.8 Proof of Proposition 11
For consumption we have
@C(t)
@
=
@C
@
+
u1
l1   CrK !
s
1;e
s1t +
u2
l2   CrK !
s
2;e
s2t
with an ambiguous sign because the rst and third are negative and the second is
positive, as
!s1; =
K l2
(l2   l1)(l2   CrK)
@K
@
> 0 (67)
!s2; =  
K l1
(l2   l1)(l1   CrK)
@K
@
> 0 (68)
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where @K

@
< 0. For time t = 0 we get, substituting the expressions from equations
equations (67) and (68) and after some algebra
@C(0)
@
=
@C
@
+
u1
u
2
  u1   u2
@K
@
which is ambiguous as the rst term is negative and the second is positive. We may
immediately conclude that @C(0)
@
> @C

@
. In order to determine the sign for the shock
in C(0), we use equations (66) and (65) and the expression for rn to get
@C(0)
@
=
n
z(; )

C(1  )
n2
  z(; )

(69)
where z (; ) is dened in (64). Observe that while u1 and 
u
2 depend on  and ,
all the other elements entering in equation (69) do not depend on those parameters.
Also, if we assume that  has a positive and nite value, as lim!0 z(; :) = 0 and
lim!1 z(; :) = 1, there is at least one critical value c, such that z(c; ) =
C(1 )
n2
> 0. In this case we have @C(0)
@
= 0 The same reasoning can be made as
regards .
From equations (67) and (68) it is clear that
@e(t)
@
= s1!
s
1;e
s1t + s2!
s
2;e
s2t =
=
K
(l2   l1)

s1l2
l2   CrK e
s1t   
s
2l1
l1   CrK e
s2t

@K
@
 0;
for all t 2 [0;1) and @e(1)
@
= @e

@
= 0. Therefore, e(t) is negative at time t = 0 and
increases monotonously (through negative values) towards zero. QED
7.9 Proof of Proposition 12.
We establish Lemma A3, which together with Propositions 5 and 7 establishes Propo-
sition 12.
Lemma A3. Critical values for . Consider only the case in which there is a positive
correlation between  and A and the case in which there are positive shocks to
those parameters. Then there is a sequence of values for ,
0 < 0 < 1 < n < 2 < K < 3
such that immediately after the shock the initial values for (K;n) will be located:
at the new (K;n) line if  = 0; at the new _n = 0 line if  = 1; at the new
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Es2 line if  = 2; at the new _K = 0 line if  = 3; for  = n and  = K it
will be located at the horizontal and vertical lines passing through the new steady
state so that (respectively) dn=dA = 0 and dK=dA = 0.
Proof If we equate equation (39) with the expressions for the projections of curves
(K;n) = 0, _n = 0, Es2 and _K = 0 and solve for , we nd, respectively
0 =  
@n
@A
+ K
n
@K
@A
@n
@
+ K
n
@K
@
1 =  
@n
@A
  K
s1
s
2 n
@K
@A
@n
@
  K
s1
s
2 n
@K
@
2   
@n
@A
  l2 CrK
Crn
@K
@A
@n
@
  l2 CrK
Crn
@K
@
3   
@n
@A
  s1s2 CrK
Crn
@K
@A
@n
@
  s1s2 CrK
Crn
@K
@
For values belonging to the interval 1 <  < 2 there is a value for  such that
dn=dA = 0, n =  @n@A =@n

@
. Also, in the interval 2 <  < 3 there is a value
for  such that dK=dA = 0, K =  @K@A =@K

@
. QED
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Figure 1: Cost functions and eﬃcient production with π = 0
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Figure 2: The reference invariant lines in (K,n)
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Figure 3: Reference lines Esi corresponding to the projections of eigenvectors
which span the stable manifold
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Figure 4: The projections of the linearized isoclines for K and n
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Figure 5: Representative trajectories for 0 < γ <∞
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Figure 6: Trajectories where K is non-monotonic in (C,K)-space
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Figure 7: Trajectories where e is non-monotonic in (e, n)-space
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Figure 8: Permanent 10% increase in productivity. Income eﬀect dominates.
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Figure 9: Permanent 10% increase in φ. Income eﬀect dominates.
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Figure 10: global shock for η = ηn
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Figure 11: global shock for ηn < η < η2
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Figure 12: global shock for η = η2
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Figure 13: global shock for η2 < η < ηK
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Figure 14: global shock for η = ηK
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Figure 15: global shock for ηK < η < η3
